DC Probate Reform Is Stalled—but Not Broken

Why the Law Is Still Fully Operative

1. The Procedure Defines the Proceeding

The revised Section 311 clearly describes the process:

• A petitioner may request “abbreviated probate”;

• The Register of Wills may admit a will;

• The Register shall appoint a personal representative;

• The Register may require additional verified proof;

• And the finality of the proceeding is governed by Section 20-331.

Even without a paragraph-style definition, the statute still outlines a coherent and well-scoped process. Courts routinely give effect to omitted terms in laws, including in cases like this where a revised law drops a relevant term to the law.  See, e.g., District of Columbia v. HJB, 359 A.2d 285 (1976) (noting that the revised law omitted “guardian” as a liable party but still permitted the District to pursue claims against a guardian to settle the District’s claim against the estate of the guardian’s ward).  

This result flows from the canon of statutory construction.  Courts routinely uphold statutes where the meaning of a term can be reasonably deduced from its statutory description or context, even in the absence of a standalone definition.  See Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566 (2012) (“When a term goes undefined in a statute, we give it its ordinary meaning… We also look to the context in which it appears.”).

As the Supreme Court repeats, context is everything.

Statutory construction … is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 233-34 (1993) (citing United Savings Assn. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988)).  Thus, any insistence that the new authority must include prior definitions of abbreviated probate for it to be workable is clearly misplaced. 

2. The Cross-Reference Still Works

Section  20-101(a) defines “abbreviated probate proceeding” by reference to Section  311. That definition is still meaningful because Section 311 continues to use the term and describe its operation. The process is outlined, the actors and outcomes are clear, and the context makes the term reasonably ascertainable.

3. Nothing Indicates Legislative Intent to Repeal Abbreviated Probate

Here’s the most important point: There is no evidence that the Council intended to repeal or discard abbreviated probate. In fact:

• The term still appears in Section 311(a) (“Upon request for abbreviated probate…”).

• The finality provision in Section  311(c) still states that “abbreviated probate” is governed by Section 20-331.
• The term “abbreviated probate” remains in  definition section of the probate code.  See § 20-101(a).

If the Council had intended to abolish the concept, these provisions would have been deleted. Instead, the statutory structure plainly shows that abbreviated probate continues—but is now administered by the Register in uncontested cases.

4. Repeals by Implication Are Disfavored

Courts strongly disfavor implied repeals or interpretations that nullify legislation unless the conflict is unavoidable.

“A statute will not be construed as repealing a prior act unless no other reasonable construction is possible.”
— Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987)

Here, a very reasonable construction is not just possible—it is obvious: the reform did not repeal abbreviated probate. It transferred its administration in limited cases. The law should be read accordingly.

5. To Treat Section 311 as Unworkable Renders the Reform Superfluous

Courts also avoid interpretations that render legislation meaningless.

“It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”
— TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)

The 2024 amendment to Section  311 provides the crux of reforming DC’s probate process.
To conclude that Section 311 is inoperable or void because the amendment could have been better drafted would defeat the entire purpose of the legislation— particularly when the reading the statute as a whole, Section 311 can readily be construed to implement the City Council’s designs to authorize the Register of Wills to administratively issue letters of administration in abbreviated probate proceedings. The Register’s failure to exercise this new authority effectively nullifies the Council’s clear intent. Courts would not accept that.

In Short: The Law Works, and Should Be Used

• Section 311 grants the Register clear authority to act.

• The procedure for abbreviated probate is spelled out.

• The definition in Section  101 still derives is meaning from Section 311 and the new process it describes.

• There is no conflict that prevents the law from being implemented.

• The statute carries out a clear reform that courts would support.

If clarification is helpful, a technical amendment can be passed to restore a more formal definition of “abbreviated probate.” But that is not necessary for the statute to function today.

Final Thought on DC Probate Reform

DC’s 2024 probate reform was a thoughtful, purpose-driven change. It made good policy. It has sound legal structure. And it has been in effect since March 21, 2025.

There’s no need to wait for more legislative cleanup. The Register already has the authority to act—and the public is waiting for that promise of simpler probate to be fulfilled.